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Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28, 2018, at 9:30 a.m. in the 





City of Missoula v. Kroschel asks the Court to define the 
parameters of an officer’s lawful questioning during a non-vehicular 
investigatory stop.1 Montana’s Terry2 stop statute, articulated in Section 
46–5–401 of the Montana Code Annotated (the “Terry statute”), 
authorizes an officer to request a person’s name and address and an 
explanation of the person’s actions when the officer has a particularized 
suspicion that the person is committing or has committed a crime.3 
Kroschel argues that an officer is limited to the questions specifically 
enumerated in the statute and an individual may decline to answer free of 
consequence.4  
 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
20-year old Marcy Kroschel (“Kroschel”) was detained and 
questioned by officers at a Griz football game upon suspicion that she had 
been drinking alcohol under the age of 21, in violation of Montana’s Minor 
in Possession (“MIP”) statute.5 Officer Shannon Parsons (“Officer 
Parsons”) first noticed that Kroschel was having difficulty walking and 
was leaning on her friend for support.6 Officer Parsons approached to 
check on Kroschel’s welfare.7 Upon smelling alcohol on her breath, the 
officer asked both young women for identification.8 Only Kroschel was 
                                                     
1 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellant%20Reply%20--
%20Brief?id=%7B90D40960-0000-C718-91BE-40D983005C6B%7D (Mont. Nov. 29, 2017) (No. 
DA 17-0184).  
2 Refers to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
3 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–5–401 (2017); see also State v. Ballinger, 366 P.3d 668, 673 (Mont. 2016).  
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–5, City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellant's%20Opening%20--
%20Brief?id=%7B8001A25C-0000-CF18-BE17-D84D200E77AC%7D (Mont. June 9, 2017) (No. 
DA 17-0184). 
5 Id. at 2.   
6 Appellee’s Response Brief at 2–3, City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-0184%20Appellee's%20Response%20--
%20Brief?id=%7B4016075F-0000-CE1B-8DF3-EDFB9AAF3538%7D (Mont. Oct. 6, 2017) (No. 
DA 17-0184). 
7 Id. at 2.   
8 Id. at 2–3.   
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unable to produce it.9 Kroschel told the officer that it was in her seat.10 
Officer Parsons asked Kroschel for her student ID number, but Kroschel 
could not recall it.11 After numerous attempts to evade the question, 
Kroschel provided a false spelling of her name and an incorrect date of 
birth.12 Officer Parsons was unable to verify her identify with dispatch, 
which is often the result of false information, and again asked Kroschel to 
provide correct information.13 To help Kroschel make an informed 
decision, Officer Parsons explained that an MIP is a citable offense, while 
obstruction of justice is a jailable offense.14 Kroschel was uncooperative, 
hostile, and tried to walk away.15 Wanting to get away from the crowd, 
Officer Parsons brought Kroschel downstairs into a quiet supply room.16 
There, in the presence of another officer, Kroschel revealed her correct 
name, allowing officers to learn that she was twenty.17     
Kroschel was charged with an MIP and obstruction of justice and 
pleaded not guilty to both charges in Missoula Municipal Court.18 
Kroschel moved to suppress her statements, arguing that Officer Parsons 
improperly expanded the scope of her investigatory stop and conducted a 
custodial interrogation without Mirandizing her.19 The Municipal Court 
reasoned that although Kroschel was “arrested,” no Miranda warning was 
required because the “booking exception” applied, and thus denied the 
motion.20 On January 28, 2016, at a bench trial, Kroschel was found guilty 
of the MIP charge alone.21 Kroschel then appealed to the Missoula County 




                                                     
9 Id. at 3. 
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2.   
11 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 3. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. at 3–4. 
14 Id. at 4.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 24.   
17 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4–5.   
18 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 6. 
19 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.   
20 Id. at 27; the Montana Supreme Court has acknowledged that Miranda does not apply to questions 
“normally attendant to arrest and custody.” State v. Morrisey, 214 P.3d 708 (Mont. 2009).  This 
stems from the “routine booking question” exception to Miranda, established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). There, the Court provided a class of 
exceptions to Miranda for questions designed to elicit the “biographical data necessary to complete 
booking or pretrial services.” Id. at 601.  
21 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.   
22 Id. at 2.  
23 Notice of Appeal, City of Missoula v. Kroschel, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2017-
0184%20Notice%20of%20Appeal%20Filed%20--%20Notice%20-
%20Incoming?id=%7B70C2345B-0000-CC19-A2CB-151CECDDFDA5%7D (Mont. Apr. 3, 2017) 
(No. DA 17-0184). 
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III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
  
A. Appellant Marcy Kroschel 
 
Kroschel’s argument is factually persuasive: after Officer Parsons 
was unable to verify Kroschel’s identity, Kroschel was brought into a 
small supply room, isolated from her friend, and threatened with jail time 
until she finally provided officers with her name.24 This, Kroschel argues, 
violates the permissive scope of Montana’s Terry statute and Miranda and 
requires suppression of her statements.25  
First, Kroschel argues that she was seized by Officer Parsons 
under an analysis of the Mendenhall26 factors, which include the presence 
of several officers, the display of a weapon, physical touching, and the 
officer’s language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be 
compelled.27 These factors are non-exclusive and indicate circumstances 
under which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 28  Such 
circumstances constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.29  A 
Terry stop seizure is lawful when an officer has particularized suspicion 
to believe that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit a crime.30 Kroschel does not dispute that Officer Parsons lacked 
particularized suspicion to stop her but rather objects to what occurred 
during the stop.31 
Specifically, Kroschel argues that police questioning exceeded the 
lawful scope of Montana’s Terry stop statute because Officer Parsons 
demanded unauthorized information and engaged in extensive 
questioning.32 A lawful Terry stop permits an officer’s brief, non-custodial 
detention of an individual to quickly confirm or dispel the officer’s 
suspicion that a crime has been committed.33 Montana’s statute provides 
that an officer conducting a non-vehicular stop may “request the person’s 
name and present address and an explanation of the person’s actions,” in 
order to “verify” an account of the person’s presence.34 According to 
Kroschel, officers did more than request her name: they asked to verify 
her identity through numerous means, including her student ID number, 
her phone number, and her parent’s phone number, when in reality, 
                                                     
24 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2–5.   
25 Id. at 9.  
26 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 10 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 12–15. 
32 Id. at 12.  
33 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 12. 
34 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
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Kroschel was within her rights not to tell the officer anything.35 Kroschel 
further cites the statutes’ legislative history to bolster her argument.36 
Kroschel next argues that the Montana Supreme Court’s opinion 
in State v. Driscoll37 is on-point and controls the outcome of her case.38 In 
Driscoll officers suspect a young man of committing an MIP offense 
because they observed him at a bar, holding a beer. 39 Officers approached 
Driscoll to ask how old he was.40 Driscoll told the officers that he was 22.41 
The officers then asked Driscoll to step outside the bar while they verified 
his information.42 This, the Court held, exceeded the scope of Montana’s 
Terry statute because at the time the officers brought Driscoll outside the 
officers had no justification to expand the scope of their investigation.43  
Thus, Kroschel argues, the evidence in the present case must also 
be suppressed.  
 
B. Appellee City of Missoula 
 
The City does not dispute that Officer Parsons seized Kroschel 
within the confines of a Terry stop but disagrees that the stop was anything 
other than a temporary detention which conformed to the requirements of 
Montana’s Terry statute.44 
The City argues that, at the outset, the stop was lawful because 
Officer Parsons had particularized suspicion to believe that Kroschel was 
committing an MIP offense.45 Officer Parsons observed a young woman 
struggling to walk by herself, which authorized a brief investigation to 
quickly confirm or dispel this suspicion.46 However, when Kroschel 
provided a false name, Officer Parsons acquired a new suspicion that 
Kroschel was obstructing justice.47  
The City counters Kroschel’s interpretation of the Terry statute for 
three reasons: (1) although the statute authorizes an officer to request 
certain information, it does not limit the officer to requesting only that 
information;48 (2) the statute permits the officer to use this information to 
“verify” the detainee’s presence, making it presumptively unreasonable to 
assume that the officer should have to accept any answer, including a false 
                                                     
35 Id. at 14–15. 
36 Id. at 13–14. 
37 303 P.3d 788 (Mont. 2013).  
38 Id. at 16.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id.   
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
45 Id. at 11.  
46 Id. at 15–16.  
47 Id. at 11.  
48 Id. at 16.  
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one;49 (3) lastly, Kroschel erred in looking to legislative history when the 
statute was clear on its face.50  
The City then pivots and makes a counter-argument: even if the 
Court finds that Officer Parsons’ line of questioning exceeded the scope 
of Montana’s Terry statute, the Court must still look to the Mendenhall 
factors to determine whether a seizure occurred in the first place.51 The 
City argues that an analysis of those factors indicates that the encounter 
between Kroschel and Officer Parsons was consensual.52 Therefore, under 
its counter-analysis, the City concludes that the Court could find that 
regardless of Officer Parson’s questioning, she never seized Kroschel 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.53  
Further, according to the City, State v. Driscoll is easily 
distinguished.54 In Driscoll, the young man provided officers with a false 
name after the officers asked him to step outside. 55 In this case, however, 
Kroschel provided Officer Parsons with a false name during their initial 
encounter.56 Officer Parsons was justified in expanding the scope of the 
stop after her resulting particularized suspicion that Kroschel was 
obstructing justice. 




The Montana legislature enacted the Terry statute to provide 
greater protection to Montana citizens than provided under federal law.58 
In debate, the legislature specifically rejected the idea that an officer 
should be able to demand a person’s name if the person is not using a 
motor-vehicle.59 This background, while helpful, is not necessary to 
Kroschel’s claim. The plain language of the statute alone provides support 
for Kroschel’s reading of it. The permissive language provides an initial 
gateway: an officer can request but cannot demand certain information, 
and an individual can consent or decline to provide that information free 
of consequence.   
 What’s problematic for Kroschel is that she lied. The City’s 
argument on this point is solid: as soon as Kroschel provided a false name 
to authorities, Officer Parsons had particularized suspicion to investigate 
whether Kroschel was obstructing justice. Thus, the outcome of this case 
                                                     
49 Id. at 17.  
50 Id. at 18.  
51 Id. at 22–24. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 26 (citing Driscoll, 303 P.3d at 790).  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 42.  
58 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 13–14.  
59 Id.  
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may depend on how the Court interprets the statute and characterizes the 
period-of-time after Kroschel was seized and before she was brought 
downstairs: 
 
Scenario 1:  The City prevails. The Court entertains but ultimately rejects 
the argument that this was a consensual “mere police-citizen encounter” 
and finds that Kroschel was seized the moment that Officer Parsons, 
“armed and in uniform, display[ed] [her] authority” by approaching 
Kroschel and asking to see identification.60  
 Because Kroschel was seized, the Terry statute applies. The Court 
notes the statute’s permissive language, and centers its analysis on the 
words “may request,” noting the absence of the word “only” which would 
naturally restrict the officer’s questioning. With some fancy-footwork, the 
Court describes that the purpose of the permissive language is to define 
the detainee’s obligations to answer rather than to limit the officer’s ability 
to ask. This is consistent with the general notion that the purpose for the 
stop is to allow the officer to conduct a brief investigation. A different 
interpretation of the statute would severely restrict the state’s interests and 
risk undermining the very purpose of the statute itself. While the Court is 
largely left without precedent for its decision, the Court looks to State v. 
Nelson to for support.  In Nelson, the Court stated that during a Terry stop 
an officer may briefly question a detainee, but the “detainee is not 
obligated to respond.”61  
Because Kroschel volunteered aspects of her identity, the officer 
was permitted to ask reasonable follow-up questions in order to “verify” 
the information. Thus, the Court concludes that Officer Parsons’ 
questioning fell within the bounds of the Terry statute.  
 
Scenario 2:  Kroschel prevails. The Court entertains, though ultimately 
rejects the notion that Officer Parsons’ mere request for identification 
violated Kroschel’s rights. The Court notes dicta in State v. Driscoll, 
which implies it was wrong for the officer to have asked for an ID, rather 
than a name, address, or an explanation of a person’s actions.62 However, 
the Court declines to answer whether the mere request for identification 
violates the Terry statute, finding error in another place.  
 The Court explains that its decision is grounded in the Fourth 
Amendment and Section 11 of the Montana Constitution’s imperative that 
any search and seizure be “reasonable” under the circumstances.63 When 
Section 11 is read with Montana’s constitutional right of privacy,64 
                                                     
60 State v. Bar-Jonah, 102 P.3d 1229, 1239 (Mont. 2004).  
61 State v. Nelson, 101 P.3d 261, 265 (Mont. 2004).  
62 See Driscoll, 303 P.3d at 790 (stating that “the officers approached Driscoll and asked for his age 
and an ID, rather than for his name, address, or an explanation for his actions,” and concluding that 
officers “improperly expanded their investigation by taking Driscoll outside.”).  
63 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.  
64 Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.  
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Montanans are afforded heightened protection against government 
intrusion.65 The Court quotes State v. Morrisey, analogizing Kroschel’s 
rights under the statute to an arrestee’s rights under Miranda:  
A “suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an 
Oxford don. Nor need [she] rely on talismanic phrases or 
any special combination of words to invoke [her right to 
silence] . . . . Lay people are not learned in constitutional 
principle or legal nicety, and to require that precise words 
be uttered would elevate form over substance.”66 
 While Kroschel’s statements indicating that she left her ID in her 
seat and did not recall her student ID number likely do not amount to an 
“unambiguous and unequivocal”67 statement that she declined to answer 
Officer Parsons’ questions, her subsequent statements that she wanted to 
leave, wanted to go home, and her persistent refusal to provide a correct 
name were the “imprecise” and “substantive” equivalent of telling Officer 
Parsons that she was exercising her rights to decline to answer. Officer 
Parsons’ persistence that Kroschel provide her correct name thus 
transformed the Officer’s request into a demand and exceeded the scope 
of the Terry statute. Thus, the Court reverses with instructions to grant 




These are merely two of the numerous ways the Court might 
decide this case.  Both parties raised additional arguments in their briefing, 
and it is possible the Court will resolve the case by finding that officer 
questioning rendered Kroschel “in custody” and required a Miranda 
warning. Regardless of how the Court decides the case and regardless of 
its outcome, the Court’s analysis of the Terry statute is likely to resolve 
the ambiguities surrounding State v. Driscoll and provide needed guidance 
regarding the scope of questioning permitted by the statute. For these 




                                                     
65 State v. Nixon, 298 P.3d 408, 415 (Mont. 2013).  
66 State v. Morrisey, 214 P.3d 708, 722 (Mont. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  
67 Nixon, 298 P.3d at 416. 
 
